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John Arrington Woodward 
Linear and Nonlinear Identities: 
Problematic Identity, History, and the European Union 
The massive transnational flows, flows of goods, people, and even 
people as goods, which determine the contemporary state of 'globalization' 
are but aspects of previously unsatisfied discourses on identity. This ossified 
concept of identity is one that is bound to the nation in the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, only to be cast outwards in the post-
World War Two 'age,' disseminated along lines of immigration, rapidly 
increasing mobility of populations, and compressed in the contemporary 
critical catchword of 'hybridity.' And while hybridity is the ability to exist in 
a multilayered socio-cultural field, in terms of Europe it is one normally 
reserved for the 'cultural other.' It is certainly a concept that seems central to 
theorizing a space for these displaced and mobile populations; yet, it is one 
that is itself bound inextricably to the old ossified concept of identity, or a 
stable locus wherein the subject can position herself in relation to the social 
whole. Yet identity is inherently unstable and indeterminate, and therefore a 
contradiction develops in hybridity, one of transnational flow and ossified 
connections. 
One way of approaching this contradiction is, strangely enough, 
through identity formation. The examination of identity has shifted 
throughout the last few decades from 'immanent' explorations of the drives 
to subjectification (e.g. Zizek through Lacan through Hegel, etc.) to 
examinations of the 'realia' of identity, its placement in the constellation of 
nation: state, community and so forth, and its representation in memory 
narratives (e.g. Andreas Huyssen's work on East German identity, just to 
name one example). In the context of the European Union, the question of 
identity is rapidly becoming a political point of contention for all concerned, 
especially considering the recent turn throughout Europe towards language 
and culture requirements as an integral aspect of immigration procedures. 
In the following pages I would like to exam the development of 
what has been termed postnational identity, a political space wherein the 
modifier of 'hybridity' neatly fits. This is a concept emerging in European 
sociology and political circles that postulates a unified and culturally 
trans~endent socio-political public sphere, and one espoused most 
prorrunently, perhaps, by Jurgen Habermas. Postnationalism is seen as a 
respite from nationalism while a means of utilizing social energies that are 
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normally diverted into feelings of nationalism. It is, for Habermas, a manner 
of combating nationalism as a negative and racialized feeling. I would like to 
situate such a notion in relation to questions of and calls for national identity 
and nationalism in postcolonial critics such as Partha Chatterjee and Homi 
Bhabha. In this context, especially in Chatterjee, nationalism works as an 
alternative to the homogenizing powers of global capital. Finally I would 
like to draw out the relationship between these discourses, and how they 
relate to the development of some form of 'identity' within the European 
Union, by examining briefly Balibar's concept of 'European Apartheid' as 
part of a critical discourse within Europe that can be found both within and 
without academia. 
The general question I would like to pose is, if there is such a social 
formulation as the 'postnational' that can be located in the intersubjective 
rather than the fictional subjective, i.e. as a guiding principal of social and 
political interaction, would such a concept offer a crucial respite for the 
'migrating' workers within the EU? Can we theorize mobility, displacement 
or hybridity without relying on ossified notions of identity? Balibar's 
concept of a 'European Apartheid' offers serious criticism of such a 
possibility. Finally, are these concepts of postnationalism, nationalism, and 
'apartheid' mutually exclusive or imbricated to a point of inseparability? My 
theory is that the juxtaposition between what one could call linear 
(idealized) and non-linear (realized) identities represents an essential 
dialectic within European society and offers evidence of the emergence of a 
problematic within the mainstream, wherein the 'liberating' assumptions of 
Western liberal ideology are called into question. 
I. 
Before it is really possible, or before it should be possible, to map 
out a 'psychophysical' location of European identity it seems necessary to 
address the question of history. While this is a critical issue that has taken on 
many forms in the past several hundred years, none of them completely 
satisfactory, I do not hope to solve it here in one fell swoop. Rather, 
preliminarily, I would merely suggest that the very concept of identity, 
however it is construed, interpreted, developed or manipulated is inherently 
historical and is inseparable from a 'historical praxis' or repetition and 
reconstitution of such. There can be no critical examination of identity in its 
many forms without addressing the place of history in such a construction. I 
wish to address specifically the development of national identity, and th~s 
am forced to tum to its historical development. But I also have a certam 
critical point to this exercise that I hope to make clear below. 
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To begin the examination of history and its complex relationship to 
the European 'national' narrative I would like to turn to Benedict Anderson. 
In his Imagined Communities, Anderson speaks of the ideological function in 
the construction of the colonial national space in the census, maps, and 
museums of the colonizing power."1 This ideological function confirmed, 
for Anderson, the colonizers' oligarchic power structures by supporting 
teleological explanations of human, cultural and social evolution, and 
founding the basis of such a power structure in 'reason' and rationality. 
They were able to imagine themselves as positioned at the pinnacle of this 
great narrative, looking synchronically across societies while 'seeing' the 
diachronic development of human society. As Benjamin's angel of history, 
the Europeans looked back on their own past and saw it 'repeated' in other 
pasts around them. According to this Darwinist narrative, the archeological 
/ anthropological evidence suggested that the western world had reached a 
'higher evolutionary plane' than the colonized - the Europeans were, to 
paraphrase Montaigne, the adults of the world, protecting their poor 
relatives' children. 2 While Anderson is careful to limit his examination to 
south-east Asia specifically, there is an inevitable double movement in the 
function of these ideological constructs that reflects meaning back onto 
colonizing Europe. The European borders, the limits of its own 'self-
generating' understanding of itself reflected in the intersubjective, cultural 
exchanges, were defined by the presence of the 'other' culture - if one 
understands this 'otherness' purely in its signification of non-European. 
That is to say that the self-understanding of Europeans in the modern age 
was to some large extent based on the ability of the European subject to 
(re)present itself as 'European-rather-than.' 
Anderson works through the lens of European rationalism and 
focuses on its physical and metaphysical construction of the colonial world, 
through cartography, anthropology, archaeology, and Enlightenment 
classification and collection; however, the function of this structuration and, 
especially, its physical counterpart the museum, was to strengthen Europe's 
hegemonic position in the world by providing empirical (preconditioned) 
evidence to support its cultural-hegemonic claims. One vector of this 
evidence was the very historical/ teleological vector that postulated Europe 
as having reached a higher evolutionary-social plane.3 
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections 011 tile Origins n11d Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 163-64. 
2 See also Tzvetan Todorov, The Morals of History, trans. Alyson Waters (Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1995). 
3 Cf. Todorov's reading of Montaigne (Todorov, op. cit.). 
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Clearly there is an innate 'postnational constellation' in a 
configuration wherein Europeans are converted to a clannish race of people, 
distinct from those primitive brothers persisting on the periphery. This 
positioning of the European as a 'clan' in a fashion that elides essential 
differences within Europe I would call the linearization of non-linear 
identities. Linearization in mathematics is a process that reduces complexity 
in non-linear formulas. Complex formulas, those where there is more than 
one unknown integer, are 'reduced' in their complexity by substituting 
possible integers for those which are unknown. Non-linear differential 
equations are (so far) impossible to solve; thus the manner of approximation, 
i.e. linearization, allows for the approximate solutions of these equations, an 
important step in such fields as engineering .. In my use of the term, the 
concept of linearization is roughly similar, though not as an isomorphism. 
Society is inherently complex and filled with contradictions and paradoxes, 
as is the concept of identity. The linearization of this concept occurs on the 
scale of the national as a means of 'solving' this problematic through 
approximation and substitution. Thus the implication being that, when 
presented with the non-linear, rational systems such as the rationalizing 
Western society tend to reduce such complexity by substitution and 
approximation. This reduction in complexity masks problematical issues 
and works its way into a foundation for a linear, fully causal narrative of 
history. The disjunction between these levels, linear ideology and non-linear 
social systems is wherein the frictions that make up 'real existing' society 
take place. 
In explanation of such a tension we could see Anderson's 
examination of the development of nationalism (as an emotive-social state), 
while distinguishing between American nationalism and that of Europe, as 
explaining the differentiation of one form of nationalism from another, at the 
same time as establishing a 'partnership' in the very Weltanschauung of 
nationalism. This can also be seen as an ideological linearization of various 
nonlinear identities into 'isomorphic' groups, e.g. France is similar to 
Germany in the very structuration of ideological nationalism. That is to say 
that 'nationalism' becomes one aspect of the linear narrative of History, 
which the very reduction of social difference worked to produce. 
A specific difference between the European form of nationalism 
and its transatlantic counterpart is, according to Anderson, the figuration of 
'awaking' that ran through European nationalist discourse: "In Europe, the 
new nationalism almost immediately began to imagine themselves as 
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'awaking from sleep,' a trope wholly foreign to the Americas."4 This trope of 
'awaking from a slumber' is mirrored according to Anderson in post-
colonial, nationalist discourse (Anderson calls this 'mimicry'); but 
importantly it reflects a drive within that new European nationalism to seek 
out some autochthony within Europe, binding the search for the 'Urkultur' 
into the search for the 'Ursprache.' The dream masked a basic bond to be 
found retroactively as existing between 'originary' figures of nationalism. 
The 'dream' from which they were awakening had been the supposed 
forgetting of this European autochthony- a binding to the earth that comes 
to a head in Nazi Gremany's infamous Blut und Boden concept. As Anderson 
suggests the 'awakening' "opened an immense antiquity behind this epochal 
sleep."S In other words, the awakening, which took the political form of a 
return to something innate, a deep autochthony (or supposed cultural 
autarky, as the case may be), something found deeper than the 
intersubjective world of society; and stemming from a society nb origi11e, it 
revealed a grander historical narrative, a narrative of world historical 
import. This historical narrative was bound to language and archeological 
knowledge ("wherever the lamp of archeology casts its fitful gleam")6, both 
of which lent credence to the existence of classifiable, cultural European 
autochthony, an original spatio-temporal location of European claims to 
hegemony. The development of such a chain of history raised the 'specters' 
of historical agents buried in the distant past of European nations, and 
ground their bones under the wheels of national furor: "Michelet [makes] it 
clear that those whom he was exhuming were by no means a random 
assemblage of forgotten, anonymous dead. They were those whose 
sacrifices, throughout History [sic], made possible the rupture of 1789 and 
the selfconscious appearance of the French nation, even when those sacrifices 
were not understood as such by the victims."7 
By 'waking' from this slumber, the nations of Europe transitioned 
into a new phase of ideology, a phase wherein the dead themselves are seen 
to speak their desires through the mouthpieces of the ideological 
apparatuses of the nation-state, and where the specters of capital haunt the 
relaxation of socio-cultural restrictions on the middle classes. In other words, 
the state (in the form of the king and Church) went from speaking for some 
higher moral essence (God) to speaking for ghosts (the noble dead), all the 
while simply transmogrifying the ideological essence to be voiced - the 
4 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 193. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid, 205 
7 Ibid, 198 
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source of its power-and distributing the centrality of state power over a 
network of corporatized power relations. 
A fundamental discursive action in this awakening is the tum to 
the past, and the reconfiguration of homogenous, mythic history into the 
'World Spirit' (Hegel) of homogeneous historical progress. This movement 
was 'progressive' not only due to the reconstruction of a splintered, 
heterogeneous and multifarious past into a causal continuity, but also as a 
means of repositioning these post-revolution societies as 'freeing' 
themselves from a particular past (the slumber from which they awoke), and 
thus moving into a 'new' future. The awakening produced a pseudo-rupture 
in history by making all things which preceded it a part of a dark, troubled, 
dream-riddled past. 
Of course, the figuration of awakening also subsumed many 
cultures, regional differences, communal particularities and the like under 
the one umbrella of national ideology. The pragmatic realpolitik which 
brought about, for example, the creation of nationalistic Germany is always 
already masked by Fichte-esque projections of telos-oriented national 
identity, a generic narrative of sorts. The figuration of awakening then casts 
the intersubjective foundation of social cohesion into the form of the national 
within the bounds of European nations as an isomorphism- the microcosm 
as the form for the macrocosm. s The binding of intersubjectivity and 
nationality works in much the same manner as the inscription of Western 
ideologies and concepts onto the new worlds they discovered. Nationalist 
intersubjectivity becomes the social doxa necessary for all social 
communication and the linearized relationship between nationalism and 
autochthony is cast onto borderless parts of the 'new world.' 
History is only truly historical, as Jan Pato~ka reminds us, in its 
problematic state.9 Meaning that the truly historical only comes into being 
as a vector within a social problematic, retroactively as it were, and as a 
critical problematization of social and political normativity. And, as Jiirgen 
Habermas has suggested, the development of a truly postnational public 
sphere is inherently problematical and problematizes the stable relationship 
s An excellent example of this would be the situation of the German Sorbs, who were 
forced during both World War I and II to 'gem1anize'. To that point Sorbs existed ~s 
'Germans' among their "German brethren" while preserving their non-Germaruc 
'identities.' See e.g. Josef PMa, Aus dem kulturelle11 Leben der Lnusitzer Serbe11 nach dem 
Weltkrieg, trans. Jan Skala (Bautzen: Kolo Serbskich Spisowacelow, 1930). 
9 Jan Pato~ka, Heretical Essays i11 t/1e Plrilosoplry of Histonj, trans. Erazim Kohak and ed. 
James Dodd (Chicago: Open Court, 1996). 
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between liberal society and nation-state.10 Now, the configuration of waking 
in European nationalism places it in a direct relationship with history qua the 
intersubjectively constituted social narrative, and orients the European 
nation-states synchronically-that is to say in direct or indirect relationship 
to the alternative forms on which they border. It is, though, at the same time 
a problematization of traditional, historical social order. It is not a stretch to 
suggest, then, that the emergence into the problematical relationships of the 
postnational in Europe constitutes a new phase of 'history' qua 
intersubjectively constituted social narrative. 
It could be suggested, as well, that the problematic nature of 
nationalism inheres in its development, or prefigures its development, for it 
masks differences within the community that could otherwise work to fray 
the edges. The linearization of this problematical nature under the deep, 
ideological structures of the historical imaginary lays the groundwork for 
what Etienne Balibar would call apartheid. Heuristically, I would propose 
that the process of development of nationalism is and was dialectical in 
nature, not in the sense of the Hegelian dialectic, but in the sense as it is 
beginning to emerge in Jameson and others, i.e. as a process in and for itself, 
one that constantly subsumes the telos of critical thought-or rather one 
whose telos becomes an aspect of each production, where each 
intersubjectively generated telos quickly buries the one before. That is to say 
that a teleology of the national historical imaginary would reveal a fnta 
morgana as the end point, always shifting meaning, appearance, 
representation, surely, but continually drawing the wayfarer into the 
shimmering heat of the future. This seems to come through in Anderson's 
postulation of the imagined community as 'synchronk', being, as it were, 
based in the communal conglomeration of information into 
contemporaneity. This therefore formulates an inherently problematic space 
for the development of a concept of living-with rather than living-among: in 
other words, people only see themselves within the nation as it disappears 
on the horizon of temporality at that dialectical moment between Same and 
Other. The question becomes, who is the other? 
II. 
Critiques of Anderson's work have come from all sides. However, 
certain po~tcolonial theorists offer a way of reconsidering the ideological 
unde~mrungs of western hegemony from within their own framework, by 
returrung the postcolonial to its position within the hegemony. While 
10 Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essnys, trans. Max Pensky 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). 
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Anderson's concept of a community developing within a 'homogeneous, 
empty time,' is essential to his model, his insistence on both mimetically 
mapping this aspect of modernity onto the rest of the world, and that the 
European mode of nationalism is 'borrowed' by postcolonial nationalisms, 
seems rather too constrictive. Partha Chatterjee has criticized Anderson by 
pointing out that, "if nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose 
their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made 
available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to 
imagine?"n. Chatterjee's critique is oriented around exploding the mapped 
relationship seen to exist between the colonizer and the postcolonial state, 
by exploring the fragments of subaltern political discourse which remain 
within the nation-state form of the postcolonial world.12 Chatterjee' s move 
in this direct critique of Anderson is an attempt to develop a broader basis 
for a heterogeneous universalism such that '"Western universalism' no less 
than 'Oriental exceptionalism' can be shown to be only a particular form of a 
richer, more diverse, and differentiated conceptualization of a new universal 
idea."13 
This does not mean, for Chatterjee, that European historiography 
has not developed and propagated the concept of the nation and the 'people' 
and then 'mapped' this concept into the minds of the educated colonized. In 
fact, Chatterjee' s discussion of the relationship between historiography and 
the development of the nation as chthonic concept mirrors Anderson's 
examination of the same.14 However, Chatterjee' s focus is not on 
demonstrating the relationship between the autochthonous 'other' and 
globalized capital as demonstrative of the development of modernity in the 
postcolonial world, a la Anderson. Rather, Chatterjee wishes to bring out the 
co11flictual nature which defines and characterizes the relationship between 
the postcolonial world and European modernity, by locating a "universal 
community" in the globalized world: "There does exist a level of social life 
where laboring people in their practical activity have constantly sought in 
their 'common sense' the forms, mediated by culture, of such a 
community."1s The struggle is not only one with the homogenization of 
community but with historical linearization, and the communally-constituting 
conflict, which is essential to Chatterjee, approaches both of these imaginary 
vectors. 
11 Partha Chatterjee, The Nntio11s n11d Its Frngme11ts: Colo11ial nnd Postcolonial Histories 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5. 
12Ibid, 13. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 95-115. 
1s Ibid. 199. 
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It is, indeed, on the grounds of community that Chatterjee places 
his search for an ethical lifeworld. In this way, there is a striking 
resemblance between Chatterjee and Habermas; though, Chatterjee does not 
go so far as to work through the construction or dynamics of such a 
universal community as an expression of intersubjective experience. Indeed, 
for the most part, this community remains an idealized space, its 
relationship to politics ambiguous and unstable. Capitalism's narrative 
conversion of "the violence of mercantilist trade, war, genocide, conquest 
and colonization into a story of universal progress, development, 
modernization and freedom," can only take place in the absence and 
abnegation of community.16 He sees this community, though, as one based 
in praxis and not history; thus, it can and should break free of the historical 
ties that bind and bring itself into the political discourse of the nation. 
In the end, Chatterjee dehistoricizes the political potential of the 
community (as an autochthonous and yet de-bordered entity) for its 
immediate political value, and in so doing restructures the colonizing 
relationship suggested by Anderson. He does not emphasize a return to 
some autochthonous cultural ideal for the discovery of temporal supports 
for the concept of community; rather, he asks for a further extension of a 
true homogeneous time. This critique of Anderson establishes the figuration 
of an idealized 'universal community' as a 'postnational' counterpart to the 
national subjectivity of the postcolonial world; but at the same time it 
empties it of political specificity. This, by its nature, 'postnational' 
subjectivity reflects to some large extent the very same discourse on 
postnationalism in Europe, especially in relationship to the EU. That is not to 
suggest, however, that Chatterjee along with many other postcolonial 
scholars does not invest some critica l potential in the development of 
nationalism in the postcolonial world; it does seem clear, though, that this 
form of nationalism is fundamentally altered from that of the nineteenth 
century. This alteration is particularly telling, in that it positions nationalism 
as. int~r-nationally oriented, and leads to questions about mobility or 
rrugration when the temporal homogeneity of the community takes 
precedence over the realia of state-sponsored identity. 
. r:ieither Anderson nor Chatterjee go so far as to reconfigure the 
relationship between modernity/ capitalism (seen as one and the same) and 
autochthony as one that is mutually dependent and interwoven. In other 
words, the march of capitalism across the globe is innate to its ideological 
teleology ("making the world a better place") and cannot continue without 
16 Ibid. 235. 
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some pagans to convert. It is the 'third world' that has kept alive the 
conquering teleology of capitalism. Chatterjee, in his latest work, does 
explore this interface as representing the reality of heterogeneous time, rather 
than the 'utopian', capitalistic (modernistic), homogeneous, empty time.17 
He believes that the view of capital / modernity as unified and forming a 
"time-space of modernity" is wrong because "it looks at only one dimension 
of the time-space of modern life. People can only imagine themselves in 
empty homogeneous time; they do not live in it. Empty homogeneous time 
is the utopian time of capital. It linearly connects past, present, and future, 
creating the possibility for all those historicist imaginings of identity, 
nationhood, [and] progress ... "18 His suggestion that the 'other' times (read: 
'primitive remnants of time' as seen by western rationalism) "are not mere 
survivors from a pre-modem past: they are new products of the encounter 
with modernity itself," offers a means of reflecting the disturbances of such a 
production back into the Western sphere of cultural interest.19 The mode of 
resistance to the homogenizing processes of capital, then, are to be located in 
the praxis of community, for Chatterjee. But this praxis of community must 
bear some normative relationship to that of the state and cannot transcend 
the normative processes within the state that determine the limits of 
community, the boundaries between the local and the national, and the 
global for that matter. The current migration of communities into Europe 
poses this very problematic. 
III. 
For Chatterjee there is an important distinction between the 
homogeneous state and the heterogeneous community; civil society appears 
in his writing "as the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered 
from the wider popular life of the communities, walled up within enclaves 
of civic freedom and rational law."20 Clearly, the presence of the 
heterogeneous community is essential to the generation of the nation and a 
aspect that he considers under-theorized. The integration of the 
heterogeneous community into the nation, however, is related to the utopian 
time of capital (homogeneous empty time) and also the normative 
'narration' of the state by and for the people. If we wish to see history as 
problematical in nature, and its narrativization as bound to the development 
of a historical imaginary whose function it is to homogenize the 
11 Partha Chatterjee, Tl1e Politics of tlie Govemed (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004), 1-10. 
l8 Ibid. 6. 
19 Ibid. 7££. 
20 Chatterjee, Politics of t11e Governed, 4. 
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heterogeneous nation, then the question of the narrative construct of nation 
as corol.lary to this process seems inevitable and unavoidable. The concept of 
the nation as narrative figures into the discussion of the formation of a 
European public sphere in that there seems to be a fundamental distinction 
to be made between the national narrative and the intersubjective realm of 
the public sphere-a distinction that could be defined, again, as a distinction 
between linear and nonlinear identities.21 For this I tum to Homi Bhabha's 
maste~ful description of the nation in temporality as represented through 
narrative. 
Homi Bhabha, in much the same fashion as Anderson, constructs 
the nation as a function of a particular temporal state (i.e. flux). This 
tempera.I state is portrayed, in Bhabha, as a split between a homogeneous, 
empty ~me and a more heterogeneous time, thus setting the ground for 
Chatte!]ee's formulation discussed briefly above. However, Bhabha sees this 
split between a pedagogic (historical / homogeneous) and performative 
(heterogeneous) ti~e as runni.ng through a hegemonic structure, separating 
: set. of competing narrative strategies that, together, generate the 
amb1~ale~ce of modem society," which then "becomes the site of writi11g 
the nation. 22 For Bhabha, the performative nature of the national narrative 
off~ets. t~~ pedagogic (historical) construction of the people (autochthony). 
~s diVIs1on, ho:wev~r, also insti~tes a temporal division, a "double time" : 
The ~erformativ~ intervenes m the sovereignty of the nation's self-
g'!1ur_~tio~ by casting a shadow between the people as 'image' and its 
s1gn1flcation as a differentiating sign of Self, distinct from the Other or the 
?utside. In p.lac~ of the po.larity of a prefigurative self-generating nation 
itself~~ extrinsic ?ther nations, t~e p;rformative introduces a "temporality 
of the in-between through the gap or 'emptiness' of the signifier that 
p~ctu~tes linguistic difference."23 In other words, the generation of the 
nation is not so much related to the establishment of an 'Other' nation or the 
self-generated differentiati~n of nation from nation, but is internally 
generated by the performative conglomeration of a liminal 'people' in the 
ideal. of the 'nation'; and this liminality is itself derivative of the very 
creation of the double-time instituted by the nation. Anderson also 
distin~ish;s between a 'mythic' 'Messianic time' and the 'homogeneous 
empty time (both terms borrowed from Benjamin). Bhabha's clarification on 
2~ A true dis.tinction between the homogeneity / heterogeneity binary and that of 
linear I nonlmear remains to be formulated, but can be assumed for the sake of this 
paper. 
22 H.omi Bhabha, "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Nation," in 
Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (New York: Routledge 1990) 291-392· 297 
2J Ibid. 299. I I I • 
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these points is to associate the 'Messianic time' with the national narrative 
and divide the 'homogeneous empty time' into double-time, where one is 
performative and the other pedagogical. 
Bhabha admonishes Anderson, as well, for not realizing that the 
essential division within signification-as-an-act (basing his argument on a 
Derridean conceptualization of signification) contributes to the generation of 
the national narrative; and this contribution is the division between, what 
Chatterjee would call, a 'utopian' time (that construct associated with the 
idealized time-structure of global capital) and the heterogeneous time of 
social praxis thus bound up with the internal differentiation which is at the 
heart of the nation: "In embedding the meanwhile of the national narrative, 
where the people live their plural and autonomous lives within 
homogeneous empty time, Anderson misses the alienating and iterative time 
of the sign. [ ... ] The 'meanwhile' turns into quite another time, or 
ambivalent sign, of the national people. If it is the time of the people's 
anonymity it is also the space of the nation's anomie."24 Clearly, by 
inscribing the people into the liminality of the nation, as Bhabha claims to 
do, he is seeking to generate a division between a hegemonic / ideological 
concept of the narrated nation (the nation as narrated for the people) and a 
heterogeneous concept of the nation (the nation as performed lnj the people). 
He does not, however, clearly lay out in this essay a methodology or 
heuristics for the exploration of what essentially amounts to the exploration 
of cultural praxis (other than to suggest that his examination satisfies 
Raymond Williams's requirements for a 'non-subjectivist' and 'non-
metaphysical' mode of explanation for the dynamic between the residual 
and emergent modes of society).25 
His mode of turning the heterogeneity of the nation into a 
generative factor for the national narrative is, though, essential to an 
examination of the dynamics of the formation of the national (and 
international) public sphere. Bhabha's insistence on 'literary' narration, as 
well, does not reflect the 'realism' of visual narration in seeming to represent 
realistically the heterogeneous, performative community (and thus 
'familiarize' its 'defamiliarizing' structuration). The ideological interests in 
this representation doubles the national narrative (pedagogy) an.cl the 
performative nation (spectatorship) into the interstice of reception. 
24 Ibid., 390. 
25 Cf. Bhabha, "Nation," 390, and Raymond Williams, Problems i11 Materialism aud 
Culture (London: Verso, 1980). 
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Though Bhabha works far too closely to the very autochthonous 
nani:e of the ~a~on which ~e criticizes as historical (pedagogical), by 
tummg the nations construction back onto its internal self-differentiation 
Bha~ha and Chatt~rjee both dehistoricize the nation in its everyday social 
prax1s b~ generating a model of nation that is continuously (circularly) 
synchroruc rather than diachronic. This allows both to locate cultural 
resist~ce (the. praxis of 'emergent' social action) in the very 'mimicry' of 
colorual narrativ: forms. Thus, instead of seeing the colonized as just that, 
compl~tel~ colon1zed and absorbed into the dominant culture, they establish 
~ ~stoncal realm that can rework the historical narrative (filled with 
bmar1es) through the filter of the synchronic social praxis of the colonized 
(filled wi~h ~bivalence); ~ o.ther words one strategy of resistance against 
~e colo~zer is the very rmrmcry' of form derived from the colonizers, yet 
filled with synchronic social meaning for the colonized: i.e. the 
representation of a heterogeneous time. As such, the historical narrative viz. 
the historical imaginary, is reworked in this Bhabhian 'resistance' i~to a 
heterogeneity informed by the synchronic conception of society. 
. The question of History always figures prominently into the 
estabhs~ment o~ homog~neous empty time as a utopian time, a figure of 
mode~ruty, and ts a utopian space for discourse about the nation. It is, then, 
on this level that the work of the historical imaginary takes place. What 
Bhabha and Chatterjee's work suggests is that 1) there is what could be 
call.ed an ideological division between the homogeneous empty time of the 
nati~n a~d the heterogeneous time of social praxis; and 2) that the 
relationship between the emergent social practices and the residual social 
practice~ informs and reforms hegemony in some specific and, perhaps 
paradoxically, ambivalent ways. 
. The theoreti~al proble~a~c for Europe that arises with this general 
model is perh~ps ob~1ous: does it imply that Europe is progressing to a new 
manner .of nation? It is through the question of History that this problematic 
can begin to be addressed, at least as it is reflected in European culture. 
~ventua!ly, ~ t~nk we will. ~e able to formulate a critical concept of 
postnational1sm as both stratified between an idealization and a realization 
and as informing the intersubjective basis of European identity formation~ 
Indeed, Tzvetan Todorov, himself a strong proponent for the EU and the 
European C?n.sti~tion, suggests that "human beings have always been able 
~o dr~w a ,?~stinction between civic (or administrative) identity and cultural 
identity.·· For Todorov this means the de facto preservation of regional 
26 Todorov, New World Disorder, 71. 
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identity, while reorienting politics towards the 'public sphere' (Habermas) 
or towards a notion of 'constitutional patriotism,' insures the success of the 
European project. The concept of 'constitutional patriotism' is one that is 
gaining ground throughout Europe as a means of bypassing questions of 
'ethnic nationalism' and still retaining the political community of national 
discourse. The conflict that arises, according to critics in Balibar's camp, is 
that this 'constitutional patriotism' will most likely retain many of the same 
features of nationalism, especially the exclusion of the 'other' culture within 
the bounds of the European geo-political space. One way past this 
theoretical impasse would be a political and socio-cultural engagement with 
the delimited and delimiting nature of the internal borders of Europe, the 
liminal space wherein the development and praxis of the nation as fictive 
ethnical unit competes with the nation as utopian gateway for immigration, 
through a 'performative' relationship with history, borders, citizenship and 
nation. 
To summarize some of the disparate points here: We can view the 
evidence on nationalism presented above as suggesting two distinct 
concepts 1) nationalism as imposed form of identity (the ' top-down' form of 
nationalism); and 2) nationalism as performative resistance and 'synchronic' 
communal configuration (the 'bottom-up' form of nationalism). Both of 
these assume the dissemination of 'nationalism' in its ideological form from 
a cultural center, i.e. Europe. It also seems that one common aspect of the 
development of 'postnationalism' is the return to a problematical, dialectical 
process of emergent and residual social practices. This would seem to satisfy 
Habermas' s requirement for problematization of the staid socio-political 
debates in the face of globalization and neoliberalism as well as Bhabha and 
Chatterjee's interest in heterogeneous praxis. Such a problematization 
removes the subject from the safe cover of the historical imaginary and 
thrusts them into the process of intersubjective social praxis, the very 
real(ized) horizon of emergent social praxis. There is also evidence of a 
conflict between the linearization and homogenization of identity and 
praxis-oriented heterogeneity and non-linearity-such a conflict constitutes 
community and the dialectic of nation stabilizing the form if not the content. 
This remains, however, largely descriptive, historical in itself, and does not 
address the inherently residual nature of such emergent praxis. To this, I 
turn to Etienne Balibar. 
IV. 
While I have written to some length about postcolonial identity in 
reference to the construction of European identity, I should now make clear 
what has always been considered the distinction between them. One of the 
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~eeply productive aspects of postcolonial theory is in the eradication of 
fixed borders within the rationalization of the world system, running the 
gauntlet between universalism and 'postmodern' individualism with 
~droi~ess. Whereas th~ identity and communal structure of the postcolonial 
inhents and engages with the remnant of the dominant culture both within 
the bounds of the community and in the world market in the form of the 
mode of production, the presence of the postcolonized other within the 
borders of ~e ~uropean Union also signals a particular 'problematic' for 
European identity. We should speak, in short, of an inversion of 
postc?loniality ':ithin the sphere of Europe. The defining nature of the 
coloru~s, elevating the Europeans to positions of educated, mature 
gu~d1ans for t~e rest of the world, inverts in the postcolonial world and 
continu~s t~ defme. even when European "axiological globalism" (Todorov 
1995) s~fts mto .un1versa.li.sm and particularism. Many of the shifts, political 
corre~tions, social transitions and the like that have taken place in the 
twentieth century occurred as a result of new ethical readings of colonialism 
and the colonizers' continuing social, political and economic 'responsibility' 
to the colonized. 
i:ow does this change the formulation, then, for the immigrant/ 
postcol?rual other? The immigrant and postcolonial other in Europe is 
placed mto the dou~le bind of determinant (non-European) and mnemonic 
~the :rzem~nto colomarum). This destabilizes the performative nature of 
identi~ m that the communal settings for such a performance are 
d~te~ed not by. the imposition of an 'axiological globalism' and its 
~1stor~cal remnants into the autochthonous lifeworld - an imposition which 
in~emmates a temporal problematic, i.e. the figuration of 'rupture,' and thus 
bnngs for.th the specter of history-rather, this relationship is oriented 
ar~und i_rumetic ass~mila.tion. The route to Europe and into Europe is an 
~nstotehan a~t of ffilmes1s, a act which is preconditioned as determined by 
distance, and IS seen as such by the dominant cul tu re. 
~oreov:r~ for many immigrants throughout Europe the question of 
perf~rmative political engagement is outside of the bounds of reason and 
legality. The sans-papiers in France, immigrants who are, normally waiting 
for P.aperwork, applications of asylum and appeals, makes it very dffficult to 
mc:mifest some fo.rm of political unity and resistance in the face of pending 
ex.Ile~ th~ generation of a 'sans-papiers' identity is normatively determined by 
~mmahty. And it must be re~emb.ered that this 'performative' engagement 
is always engendered by the dialectical relationship with the (self-generated) 
border,. according to Bhabha. In the case of immigration, instead of 
gener~hn~ t~e bo~der the immigrant actually represents the physical border, 
bears it within their very social existence. 
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It is from this perspective that Balibar brings his intentionally 
confrontational formulation of the European Apartheid. For Balibar the 
separation of the European from the non-European within the public sphere, 
within European society and European normativity, is the inexorable 
development of a European apartheid which reflects a curious relationship 
between Europe and globalization. This apartheid is spawned by the 
incursion of the European market into new parts of the world, the opening 
of the services market of Europe to non-Europeans, and the continual 
inscription of non-Europeans as just that, thus both inside and outside of the 
European public sphere, driving its economic stability, while being excluded 
from its political, social, and ethical construction. Indeed, Balibar speaks of 
this in terms of both an 'apartheid' and a recolonialization of labor power: 
"European unification, far from counteracting tendencies toward 
recolonialization of labor power resulting from the globalization of 
competition, seems rather to be the instrument of their intensification."27 
Bali bar's concurrent emphasis on droits de cite as a real political solution 
offers the potential for the problematization of the issue in a manner such 
that the resolution can only be through the structural change of the rights 
and obligations of citizens. 
Where Balibar differs from Habermas, as voice of postnationalism, 
in the representation of a problematization of European politics, is in the 
telos. Habermas encourages the development of postnationalism in that it 
problematizes the nation and the non-nation, a problematic which is to be 
addressed, for Habermas, in the public sphere of socio-political discourse. 
For Balibar the problematization alone is not enough and must lead to a 
sense of civil disobedience. Both, however, see this initial problematic as 
essential, as well as its critical working through-for Habermas to a social 
consensus; for Balibar to an essential social reconfiguration. Indeed, Balibar 
sees some deep-reaching potential in the European project as a 'vanishing 
mediator' so he has little interest in abandoning the project altogether. The 
difficulty is in the historical accretion of colonial ideologies and modes of 
production, which Balibar sees as being reproduced in the current economic 
orientation of European identity. 
I think it becomes clear that the link to be forged between what are 
otherwise mutually exclusive theoretical formulations in Balibar and 
Habermas is precisely in the development of a problematic. For both, the 
inception of problematic history must come into play, must be worried out 
as a vector whose essence, itself, is problematic. The critical evaluation of 
27 Etienne Bali bar, We, the People of Eu rope? Reflections 011 Trn11s11ntio11al Ci tize11sl1ip, 
trans. James Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 44. 
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this history (these histories) then broadens the problematic and does not 
offer solutions to it (for Habermas this could be seen as a division between 
instrumental and communicative action) -rather, they expose the insoluble 
nature of such a discourse. Once history loses this problematic nature, once 
it normalizes, then it moves into the ideological realm of the historical 
imaginary, wherein problematics are reduced to solvable puzzles according 
to the emotional economy of mainstream discourse. 
V. 
In conclusion, I would like to address the issue of linearity and 
non-linearity I brought up at the opening of this essay. I fee l that it is within 
this configuration that one can witness the attempt at working out the 
problematic of European identity ra ther than working through it - thus a 
smoothing over of the historical problematic into a normatized discourse on 
Europe rather than a continual readdressing of the problematic itself. 
For immigrant communities and enclaves in Europe, the question 
of political activism is restricted to one of ini tial legality and rights. A 
'natural born citizen' (jus solz) has the right to involve him or herself in the 
public sphere, a r ight granted by the state. For an immigrant, however, this 
right is the result of a bureaucratic process of acceptance in the eyes of the 
state, an acceptance that is always bordered by linguistic, p henotypical, and 
cultural difference. The immigrant must continually prove not simply his 
legality in relationship to the moral legal system of Europe, but also to the 
normative legal system of citizenship -she must always wear the badge, 
carry the papers of legality, of personhood, of acceptance. 
In the context of Bhabha and Chatterjee and performative 
resistance, the situation is reversed for the European immigrant. There is no 
autochthony to which to tum, no primal communal life on which to model 
this resistance. Outside of the hierarchical structure of immigrant 
discrimination, immigrants are, traditionally, grouped into large enclaves of 
decentered communal life, hovering on the border of legality wi thin the very 
center of European cities. The performance of these communities is skewed 
by the question of ownership - these are largely rental housing. Thus, these 
members do not work towards actively formulating that liminal people 
(Bhabha) nor even a heterogeneous community, locked as they are within a 
half-way space of legali ty / illegality. Yet, they do formulate the bifurcated 
remembrance of a Romanesque multiculturalism and forced imperialism -
they are the memento coloniarum on the one hand and the remembrance of 
the power and attraction of the European economy on the other. Even 
members of the new European states are relega ted to immigrant sta tus 
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within the core countries.28 And yet, the problematic of immigration and 
postnationalism is in danger of being linearized. 
What does this mean for Europe? The linearization of the 
problematic entails the reduction of complexity for the sake of 
demonstrating a singular answer to the problem. This process is currently 
taking place in the political sphere of Europe, where a division is occurring 
within mainstream political discourse over the rights of immigrants. 29 Such 
a linearization employs a particular concept of history as linear, 
teleological - a mode of history that I have called above the 'historical 
imaginary' or the manner of narrativizing history outside of its 
intersubjective foundations. Such a linearization eradicates the problematical 
nature of history, which Pato~ka sees as its essential aspect. It also eradicates 
the very problematizing nature of postnational discourse which Habermas 
sees as critical. In other words, addressing the nature of citizenship in the 
form of the postnational is also a means of addressing the situation of the 
immigrants themselves, something that Balibar sees as essentially effected 
by the turn towards the droits de cite. 
So, the problematic of citizenship and immigration is not a linear 
problem to be solved. Rather, it is the defining problematic of the new 
Europe. Its resolution drives the processes of identity construction within 
the European public sphere. And it must, indeed, continue or Europe will 
again be reduced to an economic force and the apartheid that Balibar sees 
developing will continue unabated. The central identity structure within this 
problematic is that of the immigrant - in yet another determining moment. 
The dialectic between citizen and non-citizen drives the processes of 
European identity formulation. There would be little questioning of the 
nature of European citizenship were it not for this postcolonial, postsocialist 
other within their midst. And, as such, there would be no Europe. 
28 Cf e.g. European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line, 'Workers from new EU 
member states undeterred by restrictive policy," 
< http:/ /www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/ 2005/ 07 /feature/ nl0507103f.html>. 
29 Nicholas Sarkozy is now infamous (as of August 2006) for having his men march 
into a Parisian school and take two children into custody in preparation for their 
expulsion from France. 
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